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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

UTAH STATE ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

)
(
)

CARLOS JOHNSON and RUTH L. JOHNSON, (
his wife; FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
N.A.; IDEAL NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE )
COMPANY,

RESPONDENTS BRIEF
Case No. 14225
,

(

Defendant -Respondents.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
"Tr. " refers to Transcript of Record, "R" refers to
Record, "STR" refers to Supplemental Transcript of Record and "Ex1'
stands for Exhibit.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in eminent domain, instituted by the
State Road Commission to condemn Respondents' property for highway
development. The sole issue was a determination of the amount of
just compensation to be paid for the total taking of Respondents'
property.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

At the conclusion of jury trial, a Judgment on the

verdict was entered in favor of Respondents for $95,000,00 (R. 97-99).
Appellant thereafter filed a Motion for a New Trial which the trial court
granted "unless, within ten days, the Defendants filed a consent to a
reduction of the damages down to the highest figure placed thereon by
the expert testimony. Their own expert, Memory Cain," to -wit:
$92,000.00 (STR. 2, 3).
Respondents filed such a consent (R. 104) and thereafter
Appellant initiated this appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents ask that the ruling of the trial court relative
to remittitur and the jury verdict of $92,000.00, based upon said
remittitur be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February 1974, the Utah State Road Commission filed
a Complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County to condemn a
parcel of commercial property belonging to the Respondents (R. 1-5).
The land in question was acquired by the owners in 1954,
and in the following year (1955) Mr. Johnson constructed a commercial
building upon the site (Tr. 10, 11). This building was constructed upon
a 3 foot footings with additional support afforded by 32 pilasters
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constructed on a three foot square (Tr. 11). The structure was 50' x 70'
(3500 square feet), and was of cinder block design, with flat gravel
roof, fully insulated, copper plumbing, insulated conduit wiring, air
conditioned, forced air heating and connected to the Magna Sewer and
Water Service (Tr. 11-15, 67, 80). The inside of the building was
panelled and partitioned into two major parts. The East 18' x 70' was
improved, fully equipped and devoted to a cafe operation and the
remaining portion was likewise fully equipped and devoted to use as a
private lounge and club (Tr. 14-17) (Exhibits D-2, 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 ) .
The property having been improved prior to the enactment
of zoning regulation, gave it a unique quality of commercial use in an
"agricultural zone A-20". (Tr- 59, 60, 73, 74).
As a consequence of the condemnation the entire property
was taken and the case proceeded to trial upon the single issue of just
compensation to be awarded.
In the course of the trial the landowner Carlos Johnson,
testified in detail relative to his intimate knowledge of the construction
of the building and the use thereof and further testified that he placed a
market value on the property at the date of taking at $120,000,00, to
$125,000.00 (Tr. 51, 52, 56).
Memory Cain, expert appraiser for the landowners,
testified that he utilized both the "income" and "cost" approaches to
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v a l u e , placing his greatest reliance upon the cost approach, (Tr. 84-89);
that b a s e d upon the income approach to value the fair market value w a s
$90,100.00 (Tr. 84), and b a s e d upon the cost approach, the property
had a value of $ 9 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (Tr. 88, 89) (Exhibits 11-D, 12-D).
Memory Cain a l s o testified that he made a market
a n a l y s i s of the real property and utilized this a s one of the factors in
arriving at his e s t i m a t e s of fair market value (Tr. 93).
The appraiser for the s t a t e , Zane Burgeston, relying
upon the income approach to value testified that the market value was
$ 5 9 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , and b a s e d upon the cost approach - $ 5 4 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (Tr. 170,
171).
The jury returned a verdict of $ 9 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 upon which
Judgment w a s entered (Tr. 223). Thereafter Appellant filed a Motion for
New Trial, and the trial j u d g e , granted the Motion u n l e s s within ten
days the Defendants consented to a reduction of the damages down to
$ 9 2 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (STR. 2 , 3 ) .

The Defendants filed their consent to the

reduction in conformity with the Court's ruling (R. 104).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED IMPLICIT AUTHORITY IN
DIRECTING A REMITTITUR OF $ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , AND DID
NOT COMMIT ERROR IN SO DOING.
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The Appellant argues that the Motion for a New Trial
filed in this action did not invoke the right of the trial judge to grant
or order a Remittitur, and cites as a basis therefore the provisions of
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent takes issue
with the Appellants' interpretation of said Rule and invites the Court's
attention to the case of Bodon v. Suhrmann, 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d
826, and a long line of authorities cited therein, wherein this Court
stated:
n

* * * * there is implicit within the authority of the
Court to grant a new trial on the statutory ground of
1
"excessive or inadequate damages * * *Mf the power
to order a new trial conditionally: i . e . , to order that
a new trial be granted unless the party adversely
affected by the order agrees to a Remittitur or an
additur of the damages to an amount within proper
limits as viewed by the Court. A Motion for a New
Trial based on such ground invokes the exercise^of
such prerogative of the trial court; and likewise of
this court on appeal. f l
"It has long been established that where the award is
in excess of damages shown by the evidence it will not
be permitted to stand. In such instances the court's
exercise their inherent supervisory powers over jury
verdicts, which derive from their duty to see that
justice is done: and make corrective orders necessary
for that purpose. This is done by the trial court, or
upon its failure to do so, by this court on appeal. "
(Citing numerous authorities).

-5-
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3

;:

In the Suhrmann case, supra, the Utah Supreme Court

cites Rule 59 (a) (5) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as supporting
the rule of law announced hereinabove.
This Court in a previous decision which has been
adhered to and followed in a long line of cases stated in Duffy v.
Union Pac. R.Co., 118 Utah 82; 218 P.2d 1080, as follows:
"Section 104 - 40 - 2 (5) Utah Code Annotated 1943,
provides that a verdict of a jury may be vacated apd
a new trial granted by the trial judge when damages
are excessive and appear to have been given under
the influence of passion and prejudice. Trial courts
of this land and other states grafted onto that provision
the right of the trial court to refuse to grant a new trial
when the damages were excessive, if the winning party
would consent to a reduction. The provision was thus
extended by judicial decision to permit trial courts to
require a remission of part of the damages or suffer the
consequences of a new trial. This Court placed its
stamp of approval upon the procedure, and has on many
occasions indicated that our rights of review are
limited to a determination of whether the trial judge
abused his discretion in not granting a new trial unless
the plaintiff consented to a reduction in the amount of
the verdict. "
For additional authority see Hill v. Varner, 4 Utah 2d.
166, 290 P.2d 448; Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture, 6 Utah 2d 385,
314 P.2d 842; Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U . S . 447, 55 S.Ct. 296; 79 L.Ed,
603; 95 ALR 1150.
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Further analysis of the Appellant's brief indicates
that they do not believe the trial judge can modify the jury verdict
without, in effect, depriving the Appellant of the right to a trial by
jury. Along this line this Court in the case of King v. Union Pac. R.Co.,
212 P.2d 692 (Utah 1949) stated:
"The defendant urges that if a trial judge is allowed
to set aside a verdict returned by a jury which is
supported by substantial competent evidence, there
results an infringement upon its right to a trial by,
jury. There is no merit in this contention. The
Supreme Court of the United States in Capital Traction
Co. v, Hof, 174 U . S . 1, 19 S.Ct. 580, 585, 43 L.Ed.
873, amply answered this argument when it said:
' "Trial by jury,' in the primary and usual sense of the
term at the common law and in the American constitutions,
is not merely a trial by a jury of 12 men before an officer
vested with authority to cause them to be summoned and
impaneled, to administer oaths to them and to the
constable in charge, and to enter judgment and issue
execution on their verdict; but it is a trial by a jury of
12 men in the presence and under the superintendence of
a judge empowered to instruct them on the law and to
advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a
criminal charge) to set aside their verdict, if, in his
opinion, it is against the law of the evidence. "
In view of the authorities set forth hereinabove we do
not believe that the trial Court erred in directing a Remittitur of the
verdict and that the same is amply supported by law as announced by
this Court and the great weight of authorities.
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POINT II
THE VERDICT WAS WITHIN THE RANGE OF CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE AND SUPPORTED BY THE GREATER WEIGHT
OF THE EVIDENCE.
The Record i s clear that the subject property w a s unique
in that it w a s an isolated commercial tract located in an agricultural
zone and on an arterial highway (Tr. 59, 60, 7 3 , 74) (Ex. P - l ) .
Both of the expert appraisers relied primarily on the
"income" and "cost" approach to values supplemented by their general
knowledge of market data and general experience (Tr. 84, 88) (Tr. 170,
171). The Record is long and detailed a s to the i n t r i c a c i e s of each
a p p r a i s a l . At no time did counsel for the State Road Commission object
to the testimony of the landowners' expert w i t n e s s , nor did he interpose
any Motion to Strike such testimony.
e x t e n s i v e cross-examination (Tr.

To the contrary, he conducted

91, 115), thereby giving the jury full

opportunity to weigh and judge the testimony of this w i t n e s s .
In addition to the expert real e s t a t e appraiser, the l a n d owners presented a general building contractor a s a w i t n e s s , who gave
testimony relative to the value of the building, improvements and the
c o s t of construction t

which testimony corroborated and supplemented

the testimonies of the landowner and their expert real e s t a t e appraiser
(Tr. 117-123).
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The landowner Carlos Johnson, a man 71 years of age,
testified that he acquired the property in 1954, and personally had a
building constructed thereon in the following year of 1955 (Tr. 10, 11).
In his testimony he went into great detail relative to the type of
construction, the nature and extent of the materials involved and the
nature and manner of its use and occupancy from the date of its
construction until taken by the State Road Commission (Tr. 11-61).
A careful analysis of his testimony will show that he
was totally familiar and acquainted with each and every aspect of the
construction, starting with the foundation, and ranging from that point
to a detailed description of the wiring, plumbing, partitioning, finish
and furnishings. (Tr. 11-57). Not only was he totally versed and
acquainted with such aspects of construction, he also testified he had
operated such businesses for 43 years, and in particular, had been
actively involved in the operation and/or management of the subject
building for the past 20 years (Tr. 20-24).
Mr. Johnson candidly admitted that he did not consider
himself a real estate salesman or a real estate appraiser and further
admitted that he was not a licensed building contractor, but he did state
that he had talked to building contractors and believed that he possessed
knowledge of the value of his property. (Tr. 56, 57, 58).
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Respondents contend that the testimony of the landowner
was credible and falls within the purview of the case of State Road
Commission v. Dillree , 25 Utah 2d 184, 478 P.2d 507. In the Dillree
case we had a factual situation very similar to the case at bar wherein
the landowner had resided upon the property for many years, was totally
familiar with the quality of the construction involved and demonstrated
knowledge relative to the use of the property which he had operated as
a mink ranch, and in that case this Court sustained a jury verdict
based in part upon the testimony of the landowner and there announced
the following rule of law:
"Mr. Dillree being an owner of the property, together
with his wife, was a competent witness as to the value
of the property taken and as to severance damages
incurred. There is nothing in the record to indicate that
the award of the jury was influenced by passion, bias or
prejudice except the single fact that the verdict was in
excess of the amounts testified to by the expert witnesses•
That fact alone is insufficient to persuade us that the
verdict was in fact excessive or that it was tainted by
passion or prejudice. The verdict and judgment of the
court below is affirmed. "
See also: Salt Lake and U.R.P.Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53,
189 P. 90, 92.
See also the case of State Highway Commission of Montana
\r. P ^ r g n n J 328 P.2d 617, where the Supreme Court of that state said:

-10-
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"Who are competent to give opinions on value of
property is generally in the discretion of the trial
judge. It must appear that the witness has some
peculiar means of forming an intelligent and correct
judgment as to the value of the property in question
beyond what is presumed to be possessed by men ,
generally. Lewis, Eminent Domain, § 656, p . 1127
(3d e d . ) . One who knows the real property in
question and is familiar with the uses to which it
may be put, may testify, as to its market value.
The witness need not know of any sales and he need
not be a technical expert." (Citing numerous
authorities).
Of similar interest is the case of State of New Mexico
v. Chavez, 80 N . M . 394, 456 P.2d 868, 870 (1969). In adopting the
rule permitting the testimony of the landowner to support a verdict the
Supreme Court of that state there stated:
"Appellant concedes that the prevailing rule permits
an owner to testify concerning the value of his land
both before and after a taking by condemnation
(citing authority). It argues, however, that because
the rule has been stated as one of practical necessity.
* * * we should adopt the rule followed by a minority
of jurisdictions which denies the right of an owner to
testify concerning the value of his property taken or
damaged by the soverign through the use of eminent
domain. * * *"
This Court has also affirmed the landowner's right to
testify relative to market value in the case of Provo Water Users
Association v. Carlson, 103 Utah 93, 133 P.2d 777 (1943).
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Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld the right of
a property owner to testify concerning the value of property which he
o c c u p i e s and o p e r a t e s .

Telluride Power C o . v . W i l l i a m s , 164 F.2d

685 (10th C i r . 1947)

:

In the light of all of the foregoing facts and prevailing
law the jury had before it an abundance of credible evidence and
testimony to support the verdict.
POINT HI
THE TURY'S AWARD WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND WAS
NOT GIVEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PASSION
OR PREJUDICE.
The main contention of bias and prejudice a s s e r t e d by
Appellants, stems from the fact that the verdict w a s $ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 in
e x c e s s of the expert testimony of the landowners' w i t n e s s ; however,
it should be noted that the verdict w a s at l e a s t $ 2 7 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 l e s s than
the landowner's testimony. Although it is the Respondent's contention
that the evidence and testimony presented by the landowner w a s credible
and w a s of such a nature and quality that it would support the jury
verdict, n e v e r t h e l e s s the trial judge saw fit to direct a remittitur which
w a s a c c e p t e d by the Respondent a s an alternative to accepting a new
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trial of the c a s e . For the reasons set forth under Point I, we believe
that the trial court possessed the inherent power and authority to order
the Remittitur and in so doing brought the verdict within the purview
and range of the credible evidence and testimony as viewed by the
Court.
Appellant cites as authority the case of State Road
Commission v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d 347 (1968), in support
of its contention that a new trial should have been granted. In the
Silliman case the jury verdict was set aside because it was in excess
of the amount testified to by any witness (including the landowner).
This Court held the verdict was therefore excessive "as a matter of law."
The Court noted that, otherwise, the verdict could not be set aside
unless so excessive as shocking to one's conscience. The Silliman
c a s e , presented a factual situation entirely different from the case at
issue.
The rule of law consistently adhered to by this Court on
the issue of bias and prejudice was reiterated in the case of Stamp v.
Union Pac. R.Co., 5 Utah 2d 397, 303 Pac. 2d 279. In that case
the Court stated:

-13-
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"This Court in the case of Wheat v. Denver & R.G.W.
R. C o . , (Utah, 250 P.2d 932), speaking through Mr.
Justice Crocket said:
'"We do not doubt that when a verdict is so grossly
disproportionate to any amount of damages which
could have fairly been awarded as to make manifest
that the verdict was so suffused with passion and
prejudice that the defendant could not have had a
fair trial on the i s s u e s , the trial court should
unconditionally grant a new trial. * *
"Nothwithstanding what was said therein, we regard
the true rule to be that if the verdict is so excessive
as to show that it must have been motivated by
prejudice or ill will toward a litigant, or that passion
such as anger, resentment, indignation or some
kindred emotion has so overcome or distorted the
jury's reason that the verdict is vindictive, vengeful
or punitive, it should be unconditionally set aside. "'
The Court further noted that ". . . W e have held that
mere excessiveness of the verdict is not
necessarily the standard for determining prejudice,
although it might b e . "
See also the case of Alexander v. State (Mont. 1963)
381 P.2d 780, where that court stated:
"In eminent domain proceedings, the jury findings will
generally not be disturbed on appeal unless they are
so obviously and palpably out of proportion to the
injury done as to be in excess of just compensation
provided for by Section 14, Art. Ill, of the Montana
Constitution. "
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One of the aspects of the Dillree case, supra, merits
repetition on the issue of bias and prejudice. In that case the Court
said: (Emphasis added)
11

. . , there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the award of the jury was influenced by passion, bias
or prejudice except the single fact that the verdict
was in excess of the amounts testified to by the expert
witnesses. That fact alone is insufficient to persuade
us that the verdict was in fact excessive or that it was
tainted by passion or prjudice. The verdict and judgment of the court below is affirmed. "
We believe that the Verdict and Judgment is not such as
to be shocking to one's conscience and falls within the range of
abundant credible evidence and testimony.
CONCLUSION
Of signal import in this case is the fact that the trial
judge duly considered the Motion for New Trial and being in an
advantageous position to have observed the demeanor of the various
witnesses and ruling upon the evidence throughout the trial, concluded
that no new trial should be granted if the Remittitur was accepted.
Appellant in substance, is asking this Court to overrule the factual
findings and considerations of both the jury and the trial judge.
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It is respectfully submitted that the verdict and the
Judgment on the Verdict as modified by R^^/;^>4^should stand.

Respectfully submitted,

Brant H. Wall
Attorney for Respondents
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V

I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the
foregoing Respondents' Brief to Vernon B. Romney, Attorney General,
and Donald B. Coleman, Assistant Attorney General, this
day of

_

, 1976.

Brant H. Wall
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